Online Journal of Health Ethics Vol 7, No 2, November 2011 operational environment. In the context of a vignette, this paper suggests that dual loyalty conflict in military healthcare practice in a non-operational environment is best managed via a discretionary ethic-role (Howe, 2003) . This, then, allows independent clinical judgment while at the same time minimizing ethical dilemmas, harm, and conflict to a third party such as a military commander (Williams, 2009a) . By reference to the vignette, that places the law in the context of a military non-operational environment with a patient suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Hughes & Huby, 2002; Williams, 2009a) . This paper also explains the English law relating to refusal of medical treatment and patient confidentiality.
Vignette
Sergeant Green, a serving Non-Commissioned Officer in the Coldstream Guards, has been in the army for twenty years. He has experienced numerous operational deployments, having served in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Iraq, and, more recently, Afghanistan. In his last operational tour eighteen months ago, he witnessed several of his comrades being killed and maimed by local insurgents during firefights or localised small battles. His military General Practitioner, Major Smith (a senior officer) has just recently diagnosed him with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a psychological disorder, in response to severe traumatic experiences. Major Smith recommends that Sergeant Green immediately start treatment to overcome this psychological illness with a military Clinical Psychologist. Sergeant Green is otherwise a fit, healthy, and competent adult.
As Sergeant Green is due to return to Afghanistan in six-weeks' time for a six-month tour, he refuses Major Smith's offer of treatment. He is worried about his future career in the army since, if he starts treatment, he will not be able to deploy back to Afghanistan with his comrades and is unlikely to be promoted to the next rank. For the same reasons, Sergeant Green will not give Major Smith his consent to disclose his psychological illness to his Commanding Officer (CO), a lieutenant-colonel (a higher ranking senior officer than a Online Journal of Health Ethics Vol 7, No 2, November 2011 major). Major Smith, however, has a military obligation to inform Sergeant Green's CO that he is currently unfit to deploy. However, as it will leave the CO without an experienced soldier on the operational tour, it is inevitable that the CO will want to know the exact reasons why Sergeant Green cannot deploy.
In Major Smith's medical opinion, Sergeant Green is not currently medically fit to return to Afghanistan, but with his refusal to accept treatment and without his consent to disclose his illness to his CO, Major Smith is uncertain what to do. He has a professional duty to maintain Sergeant Green's confidentiality, but also a military obligation to follow military orders in only allowing soldiers to deploy on operations if they are medically fit. He is also concerned the CO, as a higher-ranking officer, will demand to know the reason why Sergeant Green cannot deploy. Major Smith is, therefore, concerned about possibly breaching Sergeant Green's confidentiality.
By using this vignette this paper considers the following: 
Discussion
Although not an absolute duty, the duty to safeguard medical confidentiality arises from the ethical principle of beneficence (Plambeck, 2002 (Visser, 2003) . British service personnel are subjected to the domestic law of the country they are serving in and British military law. This is so that British service personnel are treated fairly and consistently wherever they are serving in the world (Ministry of Defence, 2007, paragraph 110) . Therefore, in consideration of whether Sergeant Green could refuse the offer of medical treatment, guidance can be sought from Justice Benjamin Cardozo in Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital (1914, paragraph 126) when he famously stated that a competent adult has a right "to determine what shall be done with his own body." Furthermore, in English law, unless declared otherwise by a medical practitioner and as long as the patient is of "sound mind," a competent adult is presumed to have the capacity to consent and refuse medical treatment (Mental Capacity Act, 2005) . This is even if that decision is considered as eccentric and the patient could die (GMC, 2011) . Moreover, in Re C (Adult, refusal of treatment) (1994), the court determined that even if a patient has a mental or psychological illness and decides to refuse medical treatment, it does not automatically call into question the patient's capacity to make his own decisions. The General Medical Council's (GMC) Consent Guidance (2008) further outlines the presumption of capacity. Therefore, in following the law, it appears that Sergeant Green is able to refuse medical treatment for his PTSD. Being in the military and having a psychological illness does not prevent Sergeant Green from making his own decisions regarding acceptance of medical treatment (Mental Health Act, 1983; Mental Health Act, 2007; General Medical Council (GMC, 2008a, p. 27 ).
The practical significance of being able to refuse treatment is that it enables a patient to have trust and confidence in their healthcare practitioner (Dimond, 2003) . It also helps to maintain a successful professional relationship (GMC, 2008a) An additional difficulty for Major Smith is that confidentiality may have to override other considerations that a doctor may have. This is because although Sergeant Green must be Major Smith's first concern before any other consideration (GMC, 2006; Nursing Midwifery Council, 2008) , Major Smith also has a military duty to follow military orders in only allowing fit soldiers to deploy. In the interest of the military, informing the CO of the soldier's condition may override that of maintaining the patient's confidentiality. With Sergeant Green refusing medical treatment, however, it makes it difficult for Major Smith to justify without breaching confidentiality to the CO the reason why this soldier cannot deploy.
The CO as a senior officer may order Major Smith to tell him why Sergeant Green cannot deploy. Following military orders and adhering to military discipline is the "backbone that promotes efficiency in the Armed Forces" (Soldier Management, 2004) . Murray (Cramer, 1921, p. 774 ) describes following military orders as, "…the long-continued habit by which the very muscles of the soldier instinctively obeys the command; even if his mind is too confused to attend, yet his muscles will obey." However, although military orders and discipline are evidently necessary, in the context of the vignette they become an almost physical impediment for Major Smith in deciding what course of action to take. This is because although confidentiality is a professional core value, it appears to be in conflict with the military core value of obeying orders (Kipnis, 2006) . Solving ethical problems is easier than attempting to solve an ethical dilemma where one party is likely to be aggrieved of the decision that is made (Tschudin, 1992) . When there is a conflict in determining the correct action, ethical problems should be divided between ethical dilemmas and tests of integrity (Coleman, 2009 three role-specific ethics, which involves the person following each role strictly. These consist of (i) a medical role-specific ethic, (ii) a military role-specific ethic and (iii) a discretionary role-specific ethic. Howe (2003, pp. 333-334) suggests that with a medical role-specific ethic, MHCPs would follow professional codes of practice and put their patients first. With a military role-specific ethic, MHCPs would follow military orders above everything else (Howe, 2003, pp. 333-334) . Finally, the third role is where the MHCP uses some discretion in deciding when and whether the needs of the military are absolute (Howe, 2003, p. 335) . Using Howe's three-dimensional model, Major Smith is faced with three options.
Option 1
With a medical role-specific ethic, Major Smith would follow professional codes of practice and legal obligations and would make Sergeant Green as his patient, his first concern (Howe, 2003; GMC, 2006) . He would give him his undivided attention (Rubenstien, 2003) . The difficulty, however, in following a medical role-specific ethic is that although Major Smith would be practising clinical independence (Williams, 2009a) , it would increase the tensions of the dual loyalty conflict. This is because Major Smith would not consider breaching Sergeant Green's confidentiality to the CO as professional obligations would clearly make his patient his sole concern (GMC, 2009). In contrast, the duty to follow and obey military orders would undoubtedly conflict with this position (Howe, 2003) . In such circumstances when following professional obligations, Major Smith would be taking an absolutist approach, as he would consider that his professional responsibility to Sergeant
Green is his first and only concern above everything else (Ministry of Defence, 2007).
Wolfendale (2009) would consider this action a mark of professional integrity and not military insubordination. Equally, Kipnis (2006) would assert that absolute confidentiality without any disclosure to a third party is the only way to solely respect a patient's medical privacy.
However, although Major Smith's actions would demonstrate that confidentiality and privacy is necessary to maintain patient and professional autonomy irrespective of the environment, this approach is effectively saying that he does not consider the military consequences of his actions. His actions may be perceived as military insubordination as he would fail to inform Sergeant Green's CO as to why he cannot deploy. Consequently, Major
Smith may be acting legally and ethically in one sense in upholding Sergeant Green's confidentiality. But, militarily he would be compromising legality and acting unethically by not informing the CO (Yeo, 1989) . In addition, by taking a medical role-specific ethic, it is also unlikely that he would allow Sergeant Green to deploy because irrespective of respecting his confidentiality, this soldier would still be medically unfit to deploy on an operational tour.
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Option 2
In contrast, to a medical ethical approach, Major Smith may decide to follow a military role-specific ethic and believe that MHCPs should follow military orders above everything else (Ministry of Defence, 2007) . With this approach, Sergeant Green's healthcare needs, and his confidentiality become secondary to the military need, which is to follow military orders. This may seem unethical to a civilian doctor, but in the military, while a doctor has the same degree of legal and ethical responsibility to his patients, these problems are often more complex and there may be circumstances that necessitate placing the military interest above the patient's interest (Benetar & Upshur, 2008) . For example, to disclose medical information to another person to prevent an ill soldier from deploying on operational tour or within a battlefield may seem to be a reasonable action to a military doctor.
It is, therefore, clear that preserving patient confidentiality in the military is problematic. Rogers (2006) argues that preserving confidentiality in any situation is complex since sharing information to treat and protect the patient and others from harm, often results in the widespread disclosure of personal information. Maintaining confidentiality becomes more challenging in the military since a caveat of a soldier voluntarily joining this type of disciplined organisation is that are aware that they will lose some of their personal autonomy in doing so (Visser, 2003) . Thus, achieving medical confidentiality can be flawed from the first time a patient seeks medical treatment since he or she has already made a conscious decision to reveal his or her problem to the physician (Kipnis, 2006 Contrarily, it is accepted that this position is in contrast to the principles of maintaining patient confidentiality and may be seen as morally repugnant to other civilian healthcare professionals (Crowe & Hardil, 1991) . Professionally, such a disclosure may also be seen as an unjustified breach of confidentiality and would ordinarily in a civilian environment almost certainly lead to fitness to practise proceedings (GMC, 2009) .
Option 3
It is perhaps obvious then that there is no clear-cut way to deal with the problem that
Major Smith is faced with regarding patient confidentiality. Ethical dilemmas concerning patient confidentiality are complex (Beech, 2007) . In contrast to the medical and military role-specific ethical approaches, it appears that the best approach would be for Major Smith to use a discretionary role-ethic. This role would allow Major Smith to carefully consider and determine when and whether the needs of the military are absolute (Howe, 2003 pp. 333-334 ). This role is unlikely to be appropriate in a combat situation because military doctors are not military tacticians and they lack the military skills and knowledge to make the best choice where these choices are more complicated and decisions have to be made quickly (Howe, 2003 pp. 333-334) . However, during peacetime, ethical challenges are less pressing (Simmons & Rycraft, 2010) . Major Smith would also be making a decision in an environment that is safer and more familiar to him than that of a combat situation (Simmons & Rycraft, 2010) . Therefore, using a discretionary role-ethic, Major Smith would still not allow Sergeant Green to deploy. Unlike the military role-specific ethic, where Sergeant
Green's clinical needs appear secondary to the military need not to allow an unfit soldier to deploy, Major Smith would however, still disclose Sergeant Green's PTSD to his CO. This however, would be for medical reasons in the interests of the patient and not military reasons.
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Major Smith would still be following a universal principle in that professional responsibility overrides all other considerations (Benetar & Upshur, 2008) .
While it might remain unacceptable to Sergeant Green for Major Smith to disclose his PTSD to his CO, using a discretionary role-ethic has three advantages:
First, while professional responsibility suggests that Major Smith is disclosing confidential information because he is accountable to the GMC and could face professional consequences if he did not disclose this information when it is in the public interest to do so (Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California, 1976) ; however, his actions appear to be reasonable as he is also being caring to Sergeant Green by making him his first concern (GMC, 2006, p. 2) . Furthermore, his actions are allowing for the principles of patient and professional autonomy to be respected (Seedhouse, 2001) . Moreover, he is being beneficent to his patient, which is the core of medical confidentiality (Plambeck, 2002) and nonmaleficent to the CO as a third party the soldier's CO to have him sent back home becomes more challenging (Simmons & Rycraft, 2010) . This is because a CO has many priorities and needs all the available manpower he can gather together in the field and the evacuation of a soldier from the frontline severely depletes manpower since it takes a fit soldier to remove an injured one (Gross, 2006) . This, therefore, further emphasizes the need for MHCPs to disclose information before deployment when a patient's and other people's lives could be at risk from harm (Castledine, 2010) . Thus, in reaching this decision, Major Smith would have balanced the advantages and disadvantages of divulging Sergeant Green's condition to his CO with the "level of risk at hand" (Gibson, 2006) .
Secondly, confidentiality is not an absolute right and disclosure of confidential information without consent in the public interest is lawful in certain circumstances such as misconduct, illegality and gross immorality (Nurse Midwifery Council, 2009 ). This was explained in W v Egdell (1990) , where the court determined that confidentiality could be breached when it is justifiable to do so as if there is the threat of serious harm to others.
However, such a disclosure must only be made to the person it was intended for and not to anyone else. Thus, Major Smith should only inform Sergeant Green's CO and no one else that Sergeant Green is unfit to deploy due to PTSD. In addition, Major Smith should inform Sergeant Green that he is disclosing the information to his CO in relation to a public interest and that his reasons for disclosure will be documented in his notes (GMC, 2009 ).
The duty of confidence is thus a qualified right meaning that in certain circumstances, the law may permit Major Smith to disclose personal information about Sergeant Green if it is in the public interest to do so (McHale, 2009) . For example, the GMC states personal information of a patient can be disclosed to a third party if the "benefits to an individual or to society of the disclosure outweigh both the public and the patient's interest in keeping the information confidential" (GMC, 2009, p. 16 (Simmons & Rycraft, 2010) . While this may be unacceptable to Sergeant Green, healthcare professionals should do everything they can to protect their patients from further harm (Williams, 2009a) . In addition, by Major Smith being open and transparent to the CO in giving him the medical reasons why Sergeant Green cannot deploy, it makes the ethical dilemma seem less problematic for Major Smith. This is because it also manages the dual loyalty conflict between either following military orders or professional codes of practice more smoothly rather than creating further tension in not giving any explanation to the CO (Annas, 2008) . Additionally, although Sergeant Green will not deploy and the CO's manpower will be depleted, the CO's interests will be met since it will prevent a psychologically unfit soldier to embark on a dangerous operational tour (Benetar & Upshur, 2008) . Further, at the same time as advocating Sergeant Green's medical needs, Major Smith is also effectively communicating to the CO to avoid any negative interaction between the parties that dual loyalty can sometimes create without dialogue (Williams, 2009a) . It thus prevents any undue influence from the CO as a more senior officer possibly ordering Major
Smith to divulge personal information about Sergeant Green (Wynia, 2007) . Moreover, Major Smith's actions will take into account the common interests that the CO and the Major share in allowing only fit soldiers to deploy. A view shared by Pettrey (2003) that identification of needs and recognising common interests will minimise potential conflict between parties where there is a dual loyalty conflict.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the duty of confidentiality is grounded in law and medical ethics (Plambeck, 2002) . This paper has highlighted the complex nature of maintaining patient confidentiality in a military environment especially where a patient refuses to consent to medical treatment and where his personal information is divulged to a third person. This paper has also highlighted the difficulties for military doctors when they have a dual loyalty conflict between obeying military orders and following professional codes of practice (Benetar & Upshur, 2008) . When having to follow professional codes of conduct and military orders, this role is problematic as they can be acting ethically and legally in one sense but unethically and illegally in another (Yeo, 1989) . Thus, the management of military dual loyalty is challenging and can be contradictory to the values and beliefs of normal civilian ethical principles (Griffiths & Jasper, 2007) .
Using Howe's (2003) three-dimensional role-specific model, this paper has concluded that managing patient-soldier confidential information when the soldier is suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is complex and demanding. It has also concluded that to avoid further harm to a patient and an exacerbation of dual loyalty conflict in a non-operational environment (Coleman, 2009) , the most appropriate method is to make the patient the first concern of the military doctor. Also, the doctor should have an awareness and appreciation that takes into consideration the interests of the third party (Williams, 2009a) . For military soldiers, although they subvert some of their rights and freedoms when they join the military (Howe, 2003) , they are still entitled to be treated with respect and have their private medical information kept confidential when appropriate. However, this paper has concluded that in the context of the vignette, disclosure of confidential information about a soldier without his
Online Journal of Health Ethics Vol 7, No 2, November 2011 consent to his CO to prevent the soldier from deploying on an operational tour is both lawful and ethical when in the interests of the public (Visser, 2003) .
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